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ABSTRACT
The geographical location of Internet IP addresses has an im-
portance both for academic research and commercial appli-
cations. Thus, both commercial and academic databases and
tools are available for mapping IP addresses to geographic
locations.
Evaluating the accuracy of these mapping services is com-
plex since obtaining diverse large scale ground truth is very
hard. In this work we evaluate mapping services using an al-
gorithm that groups IP addresses to PoPs, based on structure
and delay. This way we are able to group close to 100,000
IP addresses world wide into groups that are known to share
a geo-location with high confidence. We provide insight into
the strength and weaknesses of IP geolocation databases, and
discuss their accuracy and encountered anomalies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Geolocation services have become in the recent years
a necessity in many fields and for many applications.
While the end user is usually not aware of it, many
websites visited by him every day use geolocation in-
formation. Some of the common uses of geolocation in-
formation is for targeted localized advertising, localized
content (such as local news and weather), and compli-
ance with local law.
Perhaps the most highlighted purpose of geolocation
information is for fraud prevention and various means of
security. Banking, trading, and almost any other type
of business that handles online money transactions are
exposed to phishing attempts as well as other schemes.
Criminals try to break into user accounts to transfer
money, manipulate stocks, make purchases and more.
The geolocation information provides means to reduce
the risk, for example by blocking users from certain
high-risk countries, cross-referencing user expected and
actual location and more. Organizations that handle
national security find geolocation information useful as
†This work was partially funded by the OneLab II and
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well, like the DHS cyber security center [37]. Even sim-
ple emergency services, such as dispatching emergency
responders to the location of emergency use it.
Geolocation information is also important in many
research fields. It improves internet mapping and char-
acterization, as it ties the internet graph to actual node
positions, and allows exploring new aspects of the net-
work that are otherwise uncovered, such as the effect of
ISP location on its services and types of relationships
with other service providers.
Many previous papers have discussed the usage of ge-
olocation information in day-to-day applications. They
vary in fields from law [22, 43, 44] through informa-
tion security and fraud prevention [27, 11] to various
economic aspects [23, 25]. However, not many works
have focused on the accuracy of geolocation databases.
In 2008, Siwpersad et al. [40] examined the accuracy
of Maxmind [29] and IP2Location [17]. They assessed
their resolution and confidence area and concluded that
their resolution is too coarse and that active measure-
ments provide a more accurate alternative. Gueye et
al. [15] investigated the imprecision of relying on the lo-
cation of blocks of IP addresses to locate Internet hosts
and showed that the geographic area spanned by blocks
can be far larger than the typical distance between any
two IPs within a block. Thus it indicated that geolo-
cation information coming from exhaustive tabulation
may contain an implicit imprecision.
The IETF has also commenced in defining standards
for geolocation and emergency calling. The IETF GEO-
PRIG working group [19] discusses internet geoloca-
tion standards and privacy protection for geolocation.
Some examples are DHCP location, as in RFC3825 and
RFC4776, and defining protocols for discovering the lo-
cal location information server [45].
Muir and Oorschot [31] conducted a survey of ge-
olocation techniques used by geolocation databases and
examined means for evasion/circumention from a secu-
rity standpoint.
Improving location accuracy by measurements has
been addressed by several works in the recent years.
IP2Geo [32] is one of the first to suggest a measurement-
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based approach to approximate the geographical dis-
tance of network hosts. A more mature approach is
constraint based geolocation [16], which uses several de-
lay constraints to infer the location of a network host by
a triangulation-like method. Later works, such as Oc-
tant [46] use a geometric approach to localize a node
within 22 mile radii. Katz-Bassett et al. [24] suggested
topology based geolocation using link delay to improve
the location of nodes. Yoshida et al. [47] used end-to-
end communication delay measurements to infer PoP
level topology between thirteen cities in Japan. Laki et
al. [34] increased geolocation accuracy by decomposing
the overall path-wise packet delay to link-wise compo-
nents and were thus able to approximate the overall
propagation delay along the measurement path. Eriks-
son et al. [7] apply a learning based approach to im-
prove geolocation. They reduce IP geolocation to a
machine learning classification problem and use Naive
Bayes framework to increase geolocation accuracy.
In this paper we study the accuracy of geolocation
databases. The main problem in such a study is the
lack of ground truth information, namely a large and
diverse set of IP addresses with known geographic lo-
cation to compare the geolocation databases against.
We avoid this need using a different approach, we use
an algorithm, whose main features are summarized in
Section 3.1, for mapping IP addresses to PoPs (Points
of Presence). The algorithm, which is based both on
delay measurements and graph structure, has a very
small probability to map two IP addresses, which are
not co-located, to the same PoP. Thus, while we do not
know the location of the PoP we know that all the IP
addresses within a PoP should reside in the same lo-
cation. This serves as a mean to check a geolocation
database coherency: if two IP addresses in the same
PoP are mapped to different locations the database has
a problem, and we can use the distances among the
various locations of IP addresses in the same PoP as
a measure of database accuracy. The results are pre-
sented in Sec. 4.1.
We take a step further and compare multiple databases
results for the same PoP (Sec. 4.2). In case a majority
of the results in each database are identical we can ex-
pect that for each database a majority vote will give us
the correct location of the PoP, and the spread of the
locations will give us the confidence measure of the re-
sult. This will help us to identify cases where a database
reports for a large portion of the IP addresses of some
ISP the same default location (usually the ISP head-
quarters).
2. GEOLOCATION SERVICES
Geolocation services range from free services, through
services that cost a few hundreds of dollars and up to
services that cost tens of thousands of dollar a year.
This section surveys most of these services, focusing on
the main players.
Free geolocation services differ from one another in
nature. Three representative of such sources are dis-
cussed here: DNS resolution, Google Gears and HostIP-
.Info. DNS resolution was probably the first source for
geolocation information, being free and available to all
users. In 2002 Spring et al. [41] used DNS names to
improve location information as part of the Rocketfuel
project. The UnDNS tool they provided is still used to
uncover location from DNS name. However, DNS suf-
fers from several problems: many interfaces do not have
a DNS name assigned to them, and incorrect locations
are inferred when interfaces are misnamed [48]. In addi-
tion, rules for inferring the locations of all DNS names
do not exist, and require some manual adjustments. As
part of Google Labs Gears API, Google provides a set of
geolocation API [12] that allows to query a user’s cur-
rent position. The position is obtained from onboard
sources, such as GPS, a network location provider, or
from the user’s manual input. When needed, the loca-
tion API also has the ability to send various signals that
the devices has access to (nearby cell sites, WIFI nodes,
etc.) to a third-party location service provider, who re-
solves the signals into a location estimate [13]. Thus,
the service granularity is based on a single IP address
granularity and not on address blocks. HostIP.Info [18]
is an open source project, with many of its API con-
tributed by its community. The data is collected from
users participating in direct feedback through the API,
as well as ISP’s feedback. In addition, website visitors
are updating their location, which in turn is updated
as a database entry. The city data comes from various
sources, such as data donation and US census data (for
the USA). The data is provide as /24 CIDR blocks.
Another type of geolocation services emerges from
universities and research institutes. These services tend
to use measurements, entirely or on top of other method-
ologies, in order to improve geolocation data quality.
While many of the measurement based geolocation ser-
vices that we discussed in Section 1 do not provide the
ability to query specific IP addresses [24, 46, 47], one
online geolocation service that does allow it is Spot-
ter [35], which is based on a work by Laki et al. [34].
Spotter uses a detailed path-latency model to determine
the overall propagation delays along the network paths
more accurately, which in turn translates to more ac-
curate geographic distance estimation. The evaluation
process also takes into account the discovered topol-
ogy between the measurement points, and end-to-end
latency measurements as well. One-way delay measure-
ments further increase the accuracy of router geoloca-
tion techniques.
Mid-range cost geolocation services include databases
such as Maxmind GeoIP, IPligence, and IP2Location.
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All these databases cost a few hundreds of US Dollars
and provide the user a full database, typically as a flat
file or MySQL dump. Some of the companies, such as
MaxMind, also provide a geolocation web service.
MaxMind [29] is one of the pioneers in geolocation,
founded in 2002, and it provides a range of databases:
from country level to city level, longitude and latitude.
Information on ISP and netspeed can be retrieved as
well. In addition to all the above, MaxMind suggests to
enterprises a database with an accuracy radius for its
geolocation information. In this work, the MaxMind
GeoIP City database is being used for geolocation in-
formation. IPInfoDB [1] is a free geolocation service
that uses MaxMind GeoIP lite database and adds on
top of it reserved addresses and optional timezone.
IPligence [21] is a geolocation service provider, ex-
isting since 2006. Its high end product, IPligence Max,
provides geographic information such as country, region
and city, longitude and latitude, in addition to gen-
eral information such as owner and timezone. Hexasoft
development maintains IP2Location [17], a gelocation
database with a wider range of geolocation information:
from IP to country conversion, to retrieving informa-
tion such as bandwidth and weather. For this study,
we used their DB5 database, which maps IP addresses
to country, region, city, latitude, and longitude. In all
the above products, the IP addresses’ location is given
in ranges, which vary in size and reach the granularity
of a handful of addresses per range.
High end geolocation services are often priced by the
number of queries and their cost may reach tens of thou-
sands of dollars a year for large websites. Amongst
these services, and based on their pricing level, are
Quova, Akamai Edge Platform, Digital Element’s Ne-
tacuity Edge and Goebytes. Each of these companies
praise themselves with large tier-1 customers from dif-
ferent fields, who use their services for target advertis-
ing, fraud prevention, and more.
Quova [2], founded in 1999, provides three levels of
data information, bronze, silver, and gold. The ad-
vanced services contain attributes such as location con-
fidence level, Designated Market Area (DMA), and sta-
tus designations for anonymized Internet connections.
Quova’s database is based on random forest classifier
rules, synthesis rules, approved location labels, hand-
labeled hostnames, and research notes, with 6 patents
issued and 9 patents pending.
Akamai [3] was founded in 1998 and lunched its com-
mercial service in 1999, provides through its Edge Plat-
form product IP location information. Its IP location
services are a part of a much larger package of tools and
applications used for traffic management, dynamic sites
accelerations, performance enhancement and more.
Digital Element [6], founded in 2005, provides under
the products NetAcuity and NetAcuity Edge two levels
Database Country Level City Level USA City Level
IP2Location 99% 80%
MaxMind 99.8% Varies 83%
GeoBytes 97% 85%
NetAcuity 99.9% 95%
Akamai 97.22% 100%
Quova 99.9% 97.2% †
Table 1: Geolocation Database Accuracy
of geolocation information, with over thirty nine data
points, including demographics, postal code, and busi-
ness type. The IP geolocation data source is anonymous
data gathered from interactions with users. One source
for this user information is partner companies that use
the product. The information is validated using a pro-
prietary clustering analysis algorithm. The data collec-
tion and analysis are protected by more than 20 issued
and pending patents.
Geobytes [9] launched in 2002 its GeoSelect product,
which provides geolocation information. The data pro-
vided by Geobytes matches mid-range companies in its
wealth, but it is part of a broader package of services,
including reports, users redirection, etc. While in the
past Geobytes used ICMP packets to create an infras-
tructure map, current methods include also gathering
information from websites that require users to enter
their location information and then processing this data
onto Geobytes’ infrastructure map of the Internet [30].
No DNS information is used by Geobytes for their lo-
cation resolution.
In this work, databases from all three groups are be-
ing used. From the no-charge databases: HostIP.info,
Spotter and DNS (partial). Mid-range databases used
are MaxMind GeoIP City, IPligence Max, and IP2-
Location DB5. GeoBytes and NetAcuity are the last
two databases used in this work. Unfortunately, we
failed to reach a collaboration with Quova and Akamai
for this project.
2.1 Databases Accuracy
The geolocation service provider is, in many cases,
the sole source for database accuracy information. Some
vendors do not publish accuracy figures at all, such as
IPligence, while others provide accuracy figures without
explaining how they were obtained. A few geolocation
services, such as Akamai and Quova provide accuracy
figures obtained by external auditors. Table 1 provides
a summary of accuracy figures, as given by the geolo-
cation service providers on their websites [2, 3, 6, 9, 29,
17]. The table includes information on country level
accuracy, city level accuracy world wide and city level
accuracy in the USA.
All the databases claim to have 97% accuracy or more
at the country level and 80% or more at the city level.
†State level accuracy
3
MaxMind provides detailed expected accuracy on city
level based on country [28]. The accuracy ranges from
40%−44% in countries like Nigeria and Tunisia to 94%−
95% in countries like Georgia, Qatar and Singapore.
An accurate resolution here is considered one within 25
miles from its true location. Netacuity accuracy figures
are based on a test by Keynote Systems, which resulted
in an exact match for every IP address at the country
level, and state level for those IP addresses located in
the United States. At the city level NetAcuity delivered
97% accuracy. Quova’s accuracy figures are based on
an audit by Pricewaterhouse Coopers [26], which used
3 reference third party databases. Here 99.9% accuracy
was achieved at the country level and 97.2% to 98.2%
were achieved at the state level.
The accuracy of the figures in Table 1 cannot be
easily evaluated. For example, neither the means by
which Keynote Systems tested Netacuity nor the refer-
ence databases used to test Quova are revealed. Akamai
claims for 97.2% accuracy at the city level worldwide
and 100% accuracy at the city level in the USA. The
source for this is a report by Gomez [20], which defined
a node location to be unique on /23 CIDR subnets. In
addition, a Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) is the ba-
sis of the naming convention used by Gomez to identify
the physical location of its measurement nodes. The ac-
curacy of this method is thus debateable, as described
in Sec. 1.
Assesing the accuracy of geolocation databases is there-
fore a hard question, since a large scale ground truth
does not exist (or is hard to obtain). In this work a
structural approach is taken to evaluate the accuracy
of databases, gaining greater knowledge on each IP ad-
dress by locating it as part of a PoP-level map.
3. THE EVALUATION MODEL
3.1 Building PoP Maps
We define a PoP as a group of routers which belong to
a single AS and are physically located at the same build-
ing or campus. In most cases [36, 14] the PoP consists
of two or more backbone/core routers and a number
of client/access routers. The client/access routers are
connected redundantly to more than one core router,
while core routers are connected to the core network of
the ISP. The algorithm we use for PoP extraction was
first suggested by Feldman and Shavitt in [8] and later
improved in [39]. The algorithm looks for bi-partite
subgraphs with certain weight constraints in the IP in-
terface graph of an AS; no aliasing to routers is needed.
The bi-partites serve as cores of the PoPs and are ex-
tended with other close by interfaces.
The initial partitioning removes all edges with delay
higher than PDmax th, PoP maximal diameter thresh-
old, and edges with number of measurements below
PMmin th, the PoPmeasurements threshold. PMmin th
is introduced in order to consider only links with a
high reliable delay estimation to avoid false indication
of PoPs. The result non-connected graph G′ contains
induced sub graphs, each is a candidate to become one
or more PoPs. There are two reasons for a connected
group to include more than a single PoP. The first and
most obvious reason is geographically adjacent PoPs,
e.g., New York, NY and Newark, NJ. The other is
caused by wrong delay estimation of a small amount
of links. For instance a single incorrectly estimated link
between Los Angeles,CA and Dallas,TXmight unify the
groups obtained by such a naive method.
Next, the algorithm checks if each connected group
can be partitioned to more than one PoP, using parent-
child classification according to the measurement di-
rection in the bipartite graph. Further localization is
achieved by dividing the parents and children groups
into physical collocations using the high connectivity of
the bipartite graph. If parent pair and child pair groups
are connected, then the weighted distance between the
groups is calculated (If they are connected, by defini-
tion more than one edge connects the two groups); if
it is smaller than a certain threshold the pair of groups
is declared as part of the same PoP. Last, a unifica-
tion of loosly connected parts of the PoP is conducted.
For this end, the algorithm looks for connected com-
ponents (PoP candidates) that are connected by links
whose median distance is very short (below PDmax th).
In the original algorithm [8], an additional step was
implemented, called Singleton Treatment, in which nodes
with only one or two links are assigned to PoPs based
on their median distance. This step may add to the PoP
IP addresses that are not necessarily part of it. Thus, in
this work, two PoP level maps were generated: one map
without any singletons, which is considered to be accu-
rate looking at the PoP IP addresses only, and a second
map that includes singletons. The aim of the second
map is to improve location estimation where PoP loca-
tion is undetermined based on the first map only. As
the singletons are necessarily in the vicinity of the PoP,
using them does not harm the locations estimation.
In a previous work [39], the stability and correctness
of the PoP extraction algorithm were discussed, as well
as the effect of threshold settings. For this paper’s pur-
poses, the thresholds sensitivity should be mentioned,
as they may affect the geolocation accuracy. Figure 1
explores the PoP extraction algorithm’s sensitivity to
PDmax th. In the figure five ISPs are explored: Level
3, AT&T, Comcast, MCI, and Deutsche Telekom. The
figure presents the number of IPs included in PoPs when
changing PDmax th. Neither the number of discovered
PoPs nor the number of IPs within the PoPs are sensi-
tive to the delay threshold, as long as the threshold is
3mSec or above. PDmax th was selected to be 5mSec,
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Figure 1: Number of IPs in PoPs vs. Maximal
Delay
as it presents a good tradeoff between delay measure-
ment’s error and location accuracy. The number of
IPs included in PoPs decreases as the minimal num-
ber of required measurements, PMmin th, increases, as
can be expected (see [39]). In our extracted PoP maps,
PMmin th was selected to be 5.
3.2 Data Evaluation Method
The geolocation databases evaluation is conducted
using the classification of IP addresses into PoPs as
described above. Since the classification is based on
both structure and delay measurements, the chances
that two IP addresses, which our algorithm map to the
same PoP, are not located in the same geographical lo-
cation are slim. We do recognize that when two PoPs
are very close (within a few tens of kilometers) our algo-
rithm may unify them to one. However, in this case the
median of their location is half their distance, namely
not far.
To identify the geographical location of a PoP, we use
the geographic location of each of the IPs included in it.
As all the PoP IP addresses should be located within
the same campus, or within its vicinity if singletons are
considered, the location confidence of a PoP is signif-
icantly higher than the confidence that can be gained
from locating each of its IP addresses separately. The
algorithm, introduced in [39], operates as follows:
Initial Location Each of the evaluated geolocation
databases is queried for the location (longitude, lati-
tude) of each IP included in the PoP. Next, the center
weight of the PoP location is found by calculating the
median of all PoP’s IP locations. Unlike average cal-
culation, where a single wrong IP can significantly de-
flect a location, median provides a better suited start-
ing point. Median is certainly not a guarantee for good
results. If there is complete disagreement between ge-
olocation databases as for the location of a PoP, e.g., if
one of them places all the PoP IPs in London, and the
other in New-York, the median may be far away from
any of the suggested locations. However, since geolo-
cation databases are typically reliable in country-level
assignment, such an example is highly unlikely. We con-
sider this assumption later in section 4.
Location Error Range Every PoP location is as-
signed a range of convergence, representing the expected
location error range based on the information received
from the geolocation databases. As the PoP location
is given as [latitude, longitude], in units of degrees, so
does the range of convergence. This stage is done itera-
tively, looking for a majority vote for the PoP location.
For every IP address in a PoP and for every geolocation
database we collect the geographic coordinates, thus if
there are N IP addresses and M databases, and for
each of the IP addresses, all the databases suggest a
location, then N × M IP address elements are being
considered for the vote. The algorithm starts at the me-
dian location, and checks if there is a majority vote for
the PoP location within a radius 0.01 degrees (one lati-
tude/longitude degree is roughly equivalent to 111km).
If the circle includes less than 50% of the located IP
elements, we continue and increase the radius of the
circle, by 0.01 degrees each step, until the PoP location
has a majority vote. Alternatively, the algorithm stops
when the circle radius reaches a predefined threshold,
typically 1 or 5 degrees, which we define as the maxi-
mal range of error. If one of the geolocation databases
lacks information on an IP address, this IP element is
not counted in the majority vote. With a majority vote
we ensure most of the geolocation databases agree on
the PoP location.
Location Refinement After a range of convergence
is found, the PoP location accuracy is further improved.
A new median location of the PoP is calculated, based
only on IP elements that are located within the range
of convergence. This ensures that deviations in the PoP
location caused by a small number of IP elements out-
side the range of convergence are discarded, and the
PoP is centered based only on credible IP addresses.
The result of the PoP geolocation algorithm includes
per PoP the following new parameters: longitude, lat-
itude, range of convergence, the percentage of IP ad-
dresses within convergence range out of all IP addresses,
and the percentage of IP addresses within the cover-
gence range considering only IP elements with location
information.
To validate the PoP geolocation generated maps cor-
rectness, results were compared against PoP maps pub-
lished by the ISPs, such as Sprint [42], Qwest [33],
Global Crossing [10], British Telecom [5], AT&T [4] and
others. In addition, we reported [39] a limited small
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Figure 2: Map Of DIMES Agents, March-2010
scale testing of the geolocation accuracy based on 50
known university locations. The test was based only on
three databases: Maxmind, IPligence and HostIP.info.
For 49 out of 50 universities, the location was accurate
within a 10 kilometer radius. The last PoP, belong-
ing to The University of Pisa, was located by the algo-
rithm in Rome, due to an inaccuracy in the MaxMind
and Ipligence databases. Only Hostip.info provided the
right coordinates for this PoP. Each PoP location was
also validated against its DNS name, whenever a DNS
name was assigned to the interface.
3.3 Dataset
The collected dataset for PoP level maps is taken
from DIMES [38]. We use all traceroute measurements
taken during March 2010, totaling 126.7million, namely
an average of 4.2M million measurements a day. The
measurements were collected from over 1750 vantage
points, which are located in 74 countries around the
world, as shown in Figure 2. About 16% of the vantage
points are mobile.
The 126.7 million measurements produced 7.85 mil-
lion distinct IP level edges (no IP level aliasing was per-
formed). Out of these, 1.3 million edges were measured
five times or more, thus above PMmin th, and 642K
edges had less than PDmax th median delay, and were
therefore considered by the PoP extraction algorithm.
As described above, two PoP level maps were gener-
ated by the PoP extraction algorithm, with and with-
out singletons addition. A total of 3800 PoPs where
discovered, containing 52K IP addresses from the first
run, and 104K IP addresses from the second run, mean-
ing with singletons. Although the number of discovered
PoPs is not large, as the algorithm currently tends to
discover mainly large PoPs while missing many access
PoPs, the large number of IP addresses and the spread
around the world (see below) allow a large scale and
meaningful geolocation databases evaluation.
Figure 3 shows the geographical location (as calcu-
lated by our algorithm) of the PoPs discovered by the
PoP algorithm. The PoPs are spread all over the world,
in all five continents, with high density of PoPs in Eu-
Figure 3: Map Of Discovered PoPs, March-2010
rope and North America. As can be seen, PoPs are
located even in places such as Madagascar and Papua
New Guinea, which comes to show the vast range of lo-
cation information required from the geolocation databases
in this evaluation.
The following databases were studied in this work:
MaxMind GeoIP, IPligence Max, IP2Location DB5, Ho-
stIP.info, GeoBytes, NetAcuity, DNS and Spotter. For
most of the databases, the data which was used, was
updated on the first week of April 2010. NetAcuity
database was obtained on the third week of April and
Spotter located the IP addresses during April and the
beginning of May 2010.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Basic Tests
4.1.1 Null Replies
The first question asked for each database is ”How
many NULL replies are returned for IP address queries?”.
There are four flavors for this question. First it is asked
only on IPs which are in the core of the PoPs and
then it is asked for all IP addresses, including single-
tons addresses. As some databases may have better
information on end users or access interfaces than on
core routers and main PoPs, this can be meaningful.
The next observation regards NULL replies that apply
to all the IP addresses within a certain PoP: does the
database fail to cover a range of addresses or a phys-
ical location range, or are the NULL replies a matter
of a single IP address lack of information? This too is
considered both with and without singletons. Table 2
shows for each of the databases the percentage of IP ad-
dresses which returned a NULL reply for each of these
questions.
NetAcuity and IP2Location where the only databases
to return a reply for all the queried IP addresses. For
IP2Location database there are a few hundreds of NULL
entries in the entire database (for IP addresses not in
this study). This alone does not come to indicate that
the returned addresses are correct, only that an entry
6
Core PoP IP With Singletons
Database Null IP Null PoP Null IP Null PoP
IPligence 3.9% 1.5% 2.9% 1.4%
IP2Location 0% 0% 0% 0%
MaxMind 36% 10.6% 30.1% 6%
HostIP.Info 64% 38.6% 64% 29%
GeoBytes 20.7% 4.3% 17.8% 2.7%
NetAcuity 0% 0% 0% 0%
Spotter 37% 18.1%
DNS 14.3% 12.2% 28.4% 2%
Table 2: Null IP Address Information
exists. The location correctness is discussed later on in
this section. On the other end of the scale, HostIP.info
failed to locate most of the IP addresses, however on
the PoP level this percentage drops by half. It can be
assumed that HostIP.info nature of the failure is lack of
information on specific IP addresses and not IP ranges.
Further more, in most cases HostIP.info does return a
reply with country information, but without longitude
and latitude. Spotter did not locate about a third of
the IP addresses. The reason for such a failure can
be either that the IP did not respond to ping or the
IP responded to ping, but the roundtrip-times were too
high to provide approximations for the algorithm. Only
core PoP IP addresses, without singletons, where tested
here. For MaxMind, the percentage of Null replies refers
to events where no specific location information was
available. In most of these cases, MaxMind does re-
turn longitude and latitude information, which are the
center of the country where the IP is located. A list of
these coordinates is available to the users, and though
we choose in this work to refer to this information as
a NULL reply, a general notion of location is provided
by the database. DNS NULL replies are less than 15%
for core PoP IP adresses, and almost 29% when taking
into account singletons. As there is a probability that
singletons represent end users and not router interfaces,
this is expected. The effect of grouping to PoPs when
looking at DNS is significant: when taking into account
singletons, only 2% of the PoPs have no location by
DNS.
4.1.2 Agreement within database
By nature, IP addresses belonging to the same PoP
reside in the same area. One can leverage this informa-
tion to evaluate the accuracy of a geolocation database:
if IP addresses that belong to the same PoP are assigned
different geographical location, then the accuracy of this
information should be questioned. This statement is
based on the assumption that the PoP algorithm is cor-
rect and does not assign IP addresses from different
locations to the same PoP. We already discussed why it
is true based on design and previous limited evaluation.
Our experiments here further support the assumption:
in all the PoPs evaluated, with no exception, there are
Figure 4: Range of Convergence Within
Databases
always databases that support the PoP vicinity require-
ment.
Figure 4 presents a CDF of the convergence range
within databases without singletons. The X-axis is the
range of convergence in kilometers, logarithmic scale,
with 500km being the limit where the algorithm was
stopped. The algorithm progressed its testing in steps
of 1km.
IPligence and IP2Location clearly have a range of
convergence far better than other databases: over 90%
of the PoPs located using these databases have the min-
imal range of convergence - one kilometer, which is in
practice the exact same location. MaxMind, GeoBytes
and NetAcuity have 74% to 82% of their PoPs converge
within one kilometer. For HostIP.Info, a bit less than
57% of the PoPs converge within the minimal range,
and almost all the rest fail to converge. This is caused
mostly due to lack of information on IP addresses, as
many PoPs do not have even a single IP with loca-
tion information inside a PoP. The case of Spotter here
is different. As this information is acquired by mea-
surements, having almost a third of the PoPs converge
within one kilometer is an indication of good perfor-
mance. In addition, over 82% of the PoPs converge
within 100km, and close to 98% within 500km, which is
similar or better than most of the other databases. The
slow accumulation is expected due to measurements er-
rors. Maybe the most important graph here is the All
graph, showing the range of convergence when com-
bining the information from all databases. Though all
databases, have most of their PoPs located within the
minimal range, less than 30% of the All PoPs converge
within this range, meaning that between the databases
there is disagreement, though as the range grows so
does the percentage of converged PoPs. This does not
necessarily mean that all the databases have agreed on
the same location, as databases which reply with a lo-
cation for every IP have more influence that databases
7
Figure 5: CDF of Agreement Within Databases,
100km Radius
Figure 6: CDF of Agreement Within Databases,
500km Radius
with some NULL replies. We further explore this ques-
tion in section 4.2. An important observation is that
even if a certain database indicates that the range of
convergence of a PoP is minimal, i.e., 1km, it does not
necessarily imply accuracy, or in our case that all other
databases will agree with this location.
Figures 5 and 6 present a CDF of the agreement
within databases without singletons. The X axis marks
the percentage of IP addresses in PoPs that represent
the majority, and the Y axis presents the probability
for this majority vote. For Figure 5 we set a radius of
100km and in Figure 6 the used radius is 500km, within
which a majority is required. In some cases no major-
ity is found, i.e., less than 50% of the IP addresses are
within any circle with the given radius. Remember that
the algorithm selects in such a case the location based
on the largest group of votes.
Note that for all databases there are PoPs that had no
majority vote, meaning the locations diverged by more
than 100km or 500km. IPLigence and IP2Location have
the highest probability to reach an agreement within a
Figure 7: CDF of database location deviation
from PoP majority - 500km range
Figure 8: Breakdown of deviation from PoP ma-
jority CDF By region - 500km Range
PoP, while HostIP.Info, and Geobytes grow at the slow-
est pace. For a radius of 100km, Spotter does not reach
full agreement for almost 60% of the PoPs, probably due
to measurement accuracy limitations. Interestingly, for
less than 4% of the PoPs there is 100% agreement by
all databases, which once again does not correlate with
single-database observations and points to a mismatch
between databases.
4.2 Comparison Between Databases
4.2.1 Accuracy
So far, we have discussed results that depend only
on the database itself. Next we compare the databases
based on the data collected from all databases. First,
we asses the accuracy of a database by comparing an
IP location in every database to the location of its PoP
as voted by all databases.
Figure 7 depicts for each database the CDF of the de-
viation of each IP from the PoP majority vote. The in-
teresting observations here consider 40km range, which
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Figure 9: CDF of Database location deviation
from PoP majority
is a city range, and 500km range, which can be referred
to as a region. IPligence, MaxMind and IP2Location
have a probability of 62% to 73% to place a IP within
40km from the PoP majority vote, with IPligence and
MaxMind placing over 80% of the IP addresses within
500km radius. Geobytes, HostIP.Info and Netacuity
place 33% to 47% of the IP addresses within a city
range, and 48% to almost 60% within 500km from the
majority. Spotter places only 10% within 40km range
and 30% within the same region.
Some of the databases, like HostIP.Info, Netacuity,
Geobytes and Spotter, deviate less in Europe than in
the USA and the rest of the world, as depicted in Fig-
ure 8. Other databases, as IP2Location, have greater
deviation in Europe than the rest of the world. For
clarity, only two of the databases are shown in Figure
8. A drawback of all databases is that there is a long
tail of IP addresses locations which are placed 5000km
or more from the majority of the vote. Figure 9 shows
that in some databases this tail can hold 15% of the IP
addresses. Although the majority vote may be incor-
rect, this points that at least one of the databases is
very far off from the real IP address location.
Figure 10 depicts for each database a scatter plot of
the range of convergence (X axis) versus the deviation
of the IP location from its PoP location based on all
databases (Y axis). The figure demonstrates that in
many cases the range of convergence is small , yet the
deviation from the PoP majority vote may be thou-
sands of kilometers. Further more, a large range of
convergence does not imply that that the PoP center
is necessarily wrong, as again in all databases we see
cases where the range is large, yet the selected IP ad-
dress location is the same as the majority location from
all databases. IPligence and IP2Location demonstrate
an interesting phenomenon: though their range of con-
vergence is very low, the variation from the PoP ma-
Figure 10: Database location deviation from
PoP majority vs. Range of Convergance
jority location is very large. This can indicate, as is
demonstrated next, that large groups of IP addresses
are assigned a single false location.
For MaxMind and HostIP there are many PoPs at
the far end of the graph, with a large range of conver-
gence. This is caused by lack of information on spe-
cific IP addresses which does not allow them to reach
a majority vote. Netacuity and Spotter demonstrate a
scattered behavior, meaning the range of convergence
and the deviation from the PoPs majority both change.
For Netacuity this means that IP addresses are assigned
distinct locations within the same area, as with different
users in the same city. Spotter suffers from large range
of convergence for some PoPs due to NULL replies, how-
ever there is an obvious trend that places most PoPs IP
addresses within 300km range from each other, with a
small number scattered at larger range of convergance,
as can be expected in a triangulation based method.
4.2.2 Correlation Between Databases
While some of the databases have proprietary means
to gather location information, a large portion of geolo-
cation databases is likely to come from the same source,
such as getting country information from ARIN. To ex-
amine this theory we calculate the cross correlation be-
tween every pair of databases, on the entire IP address
location vector, and display it as a heatmap, shown in
Figure 11.
The strongest correlation is between IPligence and
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Figure 11: Cross Correlation Between
Databases - Heatmap
IP2Location. As was shown in previous results, the
trends of these two databases look very similar. The
correlation between these two databases is over 0.99.
Maxmind and HostIP.Info also have very high correla-
tion with IP2Location and IPligence as well as between
themselves. The correlation figures above do not take
into account NULL replies. Considering those, IPli-
gence’s and IP2Location’s correlation with Maxmind
drops to 0.8 and with HostIP.Info below 0.6. Compar-
ing all the databases, Netacuity and Geobytes correlate
the least: 0.89. Spotter has over 0.94 correlation with
most databases, expect Geobytes, with 0.97 correlation
to Netacuity. Considering that the location given by
Spotter is never a landmark, rather a result of delay
measurement, this is a high figure. The high correlation
between the databases indicates that in most cases the
location addresses returned by all the databases will be
very much alike. In cases where it is difficult to obtain
the location address, the answers may vary significantly
between services.
4.3 Database Anomalies
Though the results above may indicate that some
databases have superb location information, this is not
the case. In many cases the returned data is deceiv-
ing, and actually may represent lack of information in
the database. For example, we identified 266 IP ad-
dresses in the PoPs that belong to Qwest Communi-
cations. Out of those, 253 IP addresses are located by
IPligence in Denver, Colorado. Looking at the raw IPli-
gence database, there are 20291 entries that belong to
Qwest communications. Out of those, 20252 are located
in Denver, which is the location of Qwest’s headquar-
ters. The phenomenon was first detected by our algo-
rithm last year, in July/2009: 70 Qwest PoPs where
detected. Maxmind assigned them to 55 different lo-
cations, HostIP.info to 46 locations, IP2locations to 35
locations and IPligence located them all in Denver. In
response to a query back then, IPligence have replied
that ”In some occasions you could find records belong-
ing to RIPE or any other registrar, these are most likely
not used IP addresses but registered under their name,
anything else should be empty or null”.
Quite a similar case exists with IP2Location. For
Cogent, 2365 out of 2879 IP addresses were located in
Washington DC, which is Cogent’s headquarters loca-
tion. Out of 57 PoPs belonging to Cogent, only one was
not placed by IP2Location in these exact same coordi-
nates. For IPligence, all the PoPs were located in the
same place, too. However, Maxmind placed the PoPs
in 13 locations, Geobytes in 23 locations and Netacuity
in 31 locations (only a handful in Washington’s area).
In the Akamai audit by Gomez [20] a similar case is
described: A node in Vancouver, Canada was reported
to be in Tornto, and a node in Bangalore, India was re-
ported to be in Mumbai. In both cases those were ISP
headquarters known locations.
Sometimes differences between databases may be very
acute, with a reported node location being far off by
thousands of kilometers and even countries far apart. In
Figure 12 one such example is shown. We take a 4-nodes
PoP in ASN 703 (Verizon/ UUNET / MCI Communi-
cations) and display on a map the location of the PoP
based on each of the geolocation database. IPligence,
IP2Location, Geobytes, Netacuity and DNS all inter-
nally have the PoP four IP addresses at the same loca-
tion, however each of the databases locate it differently:
IPligence and IP2Location in Australia, Netacuity and
DNS in Singapore and Geobytes in Afghanistan. Max-
Mind and Spotter lack information on these nodes and
HostIP.Info places the PoP with 66% certainty in China.
Extending our PoP view to include singletons, thus in-
cluding 10 nodes, the picture does not change. Max-
Mind and Spotter have location on one of the IPs and
they place it in Singapore. IPligence and IP2location
place 9 out of 10 IPs in Australia, and one in Singa-
pore. Geobytes places this last IP address in Singapore
too, yet 6 out of 10 IP locations still point to Kabul.
The rest three nodes are located in Australia. Geobytes
does give low certainty rate to the location, being 50 or
less to both country and region. Netacuity places 8 out
of 10 IPs in Singpore and 2 in Australia. HostIP.Info
has location information on 6 IPs, 3 of them are placed
in China and 3 in Australia, but in Melbourne, far from
IPligence and IP2location designated location. Notably,
all the edges in this PoP have less than 3.5mS delay and
are measured five to 173 times each.
The mismatch between databases is not uncommon.
Some examples exist inside the United States, too: in
Figure 13 we show one PoP in ASN 3549, Global Cross-
ing, as it is placed by the different geolocation databases
all across the country. This PoP has over 160 IP ad-
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Figure 12: Mismatch Between Databases -
UUNET
Figure 13: Mismatch Between Databases -
Global Crossing
dresses, counting singletons, and as such a majority in
each database has more substance. IPligence places the
PoP with more than 90% majority in Springfield, Mis-
souri. MaxMind and IP2Location point to Saint Louis,
Missouri with 92% and 82% accordingly. NetAcuity
indicates that the PoP is in San-Jose, California with
100% certainty, while DNS and Spotter place the PoP
in this vicinity, in a radius of a few tens of kilome-
ters. GeoBytes has somewhat above 59% of the loca-
tions pointing to New York, with other common answers
being spread across California (25%). Geobytes country
certainty here was 100% with 42% region certainty for
the IP addresses it located in New York. HostIP.Info
placed the PoP in Chicago with 65% majority (28% of
the locations had pointed to Santa Clara, California).
The above are not single incidents. Similar cases have
been found in other AS as well, such as REACH (AS
4637), where IPligence, IP2location and Maxmind lo-
cated a PoP in China, Geobytes located it in Australia,
while Netacuity and Spotter put it in the silicon valley,
USA. Other cases range from AS16735 (CTBC/Algar
Telecom) where PoP locations in Brazil were set thou-
sands of kilometers apart, to Savvis (AS3561) which is
another case of locations spread across the USA.
4.4 Database Changes
One of the motivations to update geolocation databases
is the claim that they change significantly over time.
Maxmind[29] claim that it looses accuracy at a rate of
approximately 1.5% per month. IP2Location [17] state
that on average, there are 5%-10% of the records being
updated in the databases every month due to IP address
range relocation and new range available. Based on the
PoPs dataset, we compare this information versus the
databases at our disposal. For IPligence, an average
of approximately one percent of the addresses changes
every month, with some minimal changes in some con-
secutive months, such as 0.6% between November and
December 2009. In HostIP.Info, 18% of the IP addresses
changed their location within nine months, meaning
an average of 2% a month. IP2Location changed only
1% of the locations over 4 months, meaning 0.25% per
month, however the reference set here included only
10K IP addresses. For Netacuity, running only on our
dataset of 104K IP addresses, we observe that 2.4% of
the IP addresses have changed in less than a month.
5. DISCUSSION
Interpretation of the results in Section 4.2 should be
done with care. Placing a PoP at the majority center
of gravity may not always yield the true results, e.g., in
cases where a single wrong information source is used
by multiple databases.
IPligence and IP2Location share several similar char-
acteristics as well as strong cross correlation. This is
exhibited by the high probability for a small range of
convergence and by the fast rate their probability grows
to reach a high level of agreement. However, the vari-
ous anomalies found in their databases shed a different
light on these results. For example, if for a certain ISP
all the IP addresses are assigned to a single location,
then the immediate effect will be a small range of con-
vergence and high level of agreement. Further more,
lack of NULL replies in this case may be misleading
as the returned reply may be false. As in the cases
of MCI/UUNET and Global Crossing, as well as other
investigated cases, IP2Location and IPligence located
IP addresses far from Spotter’s estimated location, it is
likely that their geolocation information, in these cases,
was wrong.
Judging MaxMind performance has to be done care-
fully, as they do not claim to have high accuracy for
router interfaces. This is manifested in the high num-
ber of returned NULL replies. MaxMind seems to have
a lot in common with IPligence and IP2Location, as the
cross correlation shows, however unlike these databases
MaxMind prefers to return NULL or country center re-
ply when a location is unknown and thus returns less
false locations.
We find it hard to analyze Geobytes performance.
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The database returns relatively a lot of NULL replies,
which are significantly reduced by PoP level aggrega-
tion. Further more, the granularity of the database is
/24 CIDR, thus grouping every 256 address block to a
single location. Though this is a common practice, it
has some degradation effect. The oddity here is that
there are many cases where the range of convergence
is about 250km, which means the database located the
IP addresses within each others’ area, but did not con-
sider them to be at the exact same city. However, as
Geobytes indicate that they focus on the service area
of a PoP rather then the location of that PoP, this can
be expected. An advantage of Geobytes is that no as-
signment to a single location or ISP headquarters were
detected so far.
The main drawback of HostIP.Info is the lack of in-
formation. As most of the IP addresses and over a
third of the PoPs did not have any location informa-
tion, the knowledge gained on this database is limited.
The limited location information led HostIP.info to per-
form worst on almost all test cases. In addition, in more
than a single case the location information indicated by
the database was far off from any other database or
measurement based location.
Netacuity is probably the most expensive and highly
claimed database used in this research. The results of
the tests however may not stand up to expectations.
Though one may assume that majority location is af-
fected by errors in other databases, it can be expected
that when compared to itself the performance will be
high. The results show that for over 40% of the cases,
same PoP IP addresses are not all located within 100km
radius, which is in fact 200km diameter, and close to
20% are not located within 500km radius either. The
strength of Netacuity is that ISP IP addresses are rarely
assigned to a single location, unless this is indeed a true
single place. In addition, in the several anomalous cases
that were investigated, Netacuity majority pointed to
the most probable correct location. Note that a minor-
ity of IP location votes still pointed to different loca-
tions, even in different countries.
5.1 Active Measurement Accuracy
Active measurements are used by many geolocation
services [24, 46, 35] and by other projects for different
localization tasks, most notably for assigning IP ad-
dresses to PoPs [41]. Spotter geolocation is based solely
on active measurements, thus we selected to study its
performance to a greater depth due to the importance
of understanding the limitations of this approach.
Figures 14 and 15 show Spotter’s overall performance
compared with its performance for PoPs located only in
Europe or in the USA. It is clear from both figures that
in Europe Spotter perform much better than in the USA
and slightly better than the world average. For exam-
Figure 14: Breakdown of the agreement CDF
for Spotter by region.
Figure 15: Breakdown of the convergence range
CDF for Spotter by region.
ple, for 40km radius (which is frequently used as a city
diameter) Spotter reach about 78% convergence in Eu-
rope compared to 67% convergence worldwide, and only
44% for the USA. The difference can be explained∗ by
the spread of vantage points used by Spotter, which are
almost entirely based on PlanetLab nodes. While in Eu-
rope PlanetLab nodes are well spread geographically, in
the USA, most PlanetLab nodes are located along the
coasts making localization of IP addresses in the middle
of the USA less accurate. Interestingly, other databases
which are based on other means also achieve better re-
sults for European addresses than for USA addresses
(see Fig. 16).
Spotter convergence (Fig. 4) starts as the lowest which
is an outcome of the measurement error that tend to
spread the results for different IPs around the ‘true’
location. However, at a radius of 100km it closes the
gap with most databases and reaches over 80% conver-
gence (and close to 90% for Europe). However, 20%
‘error’ may make distance measurements unfit as the
sole method for assigning IP address to PoPs.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a comprehensive study of geolo-
cation databases, comparing a large number of databases
∗We consulted Peter Haga and Peter Matray from the Spot-
ter project on this aspect.
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Figure 16: CDF of AgreementWithin Databases
In Europe, 500km Radius
of different types. The results show that while some of
the databases provide results that are well aggregated
and have a small number of NULL replies, the accu-
racy of the returned location can not be trusted. There
is a strong correlation between all databases, which in-
dicated that the vast majority of location information
replies are correct. However, in some cases there are
errors in the databases in the range of thousands of
kilometers and countries apart. The use of geolocation
database should therefore be careful and its information
can not be considered as ground truth.
Our results also show that measurement based ge-
olocation can achieve good results that compete with
geolocation information gathered by other means and
that the achieved accuracy of geolocation using such
tools can be fairly high. However, this accuracy may
not be high enough to be used as a the sole tool to
map IP addresses to PoPs. Future research in this field
should focus on means to decide on ground truth when
there is a disagreement between the databases.
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